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between Economics and Terrorism
Abstract
This paper builds on existing research on the determinants of terrorism by looking at new measures of
poverty in addition to political freedom, population fractionalization, and other country characteristics.
The findings of this paper reinforce the conclusions of existing literature that political freedom is a key
determinant of terrorism, with the greatest risk coming from countries that are middling between liberal
democracy and authoritarian control. Further, this paper supports recent conclusions that linguistic
fractionalization and geography are both related to terrorist risk as well. The new finding in this paper is
that adult unemployment rate is also a significant predictor of terrorism, though it can only explain a small
portion of the overall terrorist risk in a country. This paper also suggests that the Gini Index of economic
inequality may also have a significant correlation with terrorist risk. The results overall imply that
exclusion from the economy can be a motivator for terrorism just as exclusion from politics can be,
regardless of the overall wealth of a country.
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Introduction
Recent empirical work on the causes of terrorism has suggested that in contrast to
studies on political coups and civil wars, economic factors are not significant predictors
of terrorism. If these results hold up to further testing, the implications for governmental
policy are potentially tremendous. This paper will build on work by Alberto Abadie
(2004) to test the robustness of his conclusions and to see if economic factors have a
causal relationship with the risk of terrorism.
Currently there are two general schools of thought on the root causes of terrorism.
The side usually endorsed by the current U.S. administration believes primarily that
spreading freedom and democracy will eat away at the political frustration and lack of
rights that cause marginalized groups to lash out with terrorism. To quote from President
Bush’s 2005 State of the Union Address, “The only force powerful enough to stop the
rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom.”
The European Union tends to take the other perspective that terrorism must be fought at
its root causes, and that these causes include poverty and inequality, though they also
acknowledge the importance of political rights. It is important to realize that these are
not two dramatically opposed views, but rather a spectrum in which some countries
weigh economic opportunity as more important than political freedom, and vice versa.
If the recent suggestions that political rights alone determine the level of terrorism
prove correct, then it could add additional justification to calls for the toppling of
oppressive governments and the use of force to spur transition to democracy. However,
if economic opportunity is also shown to have a relation to terrorism, then more peaceful
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methods of preventing terrorism may be available. It is evident from this ongoing debate
that the questions this paper asks are extremely important.

Review of Literature
Until very recently, almost all empirical work done on the causes of terrorism had
a focus on transnational terrorism. The few exceptions tend to be anomalous case studies,
usually of Israel and Palestine, one of the few hotbeds of terrorism where the data are
available and good. Studies such as in Krueger and Laitin (2003) find that GDP per
capita and GDP growth rate are not significant predictors of transnational terrorism, but
that politically free countries are likely to be targeted by agents from politically
oppressed countries, regardless of wealth. Other studies like Krueger and Malečková
(2003) go further against conventional wisdom that assumes poverty is a source of
terrorism, concluding that among Palestinians wealthier and more educated individuals
are actually more likely to be terrorists than poorer individuals.
International terrorism is extremely important to study, but according to the MIPT
Terrorism Knowledge Base, funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
international terrorism has only accounted for 10-15% of the total global number of
terrorist acts in each of the last three completed years (2002-2004). This means that these
studies are only looking at one narrow kind of terrorism. While it may be the case that
international acts have drawn the most attention since the September 11 attacks, it is
worth noting that the second most deadly attack on U.S. soil, the Oklahoma City
bombing, was a purely domestic act of terrorism.
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Very recent work by Abadie (2004) is able to make significant improvements on
previous work because he uses an inclusive and robust measure of terrorism as his
dependent variable. Rather than using U.S. Department of State data which only count
instances of transnational terrorism, Abadie (2004) chose country-level index data
assessing the combined risk of both domestic terrorism within a country and transnational
terrorism on that country’s territory at home and interests abroad. This index allows
consideration of a much wider and more realistic range of terrorist activities, in addition
to expanding the number of countries that can be considered. Nonetheless, the Abadie
(2004) paper points to conclusions similar to the earlier transnational studies, finding that
GDP per capita has little to do with terrorism and that political freedom is the most
important determinant of such acts.
Despite many strengths, Abadie (2004) still leaves room for further improvement.
In measuring economic factors, only GDP per capita was considered, though the UN
Human Development Index and the Gini Index were tested for robustness.

Other

hypothesized predictors of terrorism that have been tested in previous literature, such as
GDP growth and unemployment level, were not investigated.
The determinants of international terrorism have been investigated very
thoroughly, but it remains to be seen to what extent those results apply when domestic
terrorism is also considered. This paper builds on Abadie (2004) by introducing an
updated dataset and including a variable for total adult unemployment rate. Replicating
much of the Abadie (2004) methodology, this paper finds that unemployment is a
significant predictor of terrorism in addition to political freedom, population
fractionalization, and geography.
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Data
Table I includes brief definitions and descriptive statistics of the dataset described
below. Following Abadie (2004), as my measure of the risk of terrorism I use the
notoriously difficult to obtain World Market Research Centre’s Global Terrorism Index
2003/4 (GTI). The GTI includes domestic and transnational acts that fall under a broad
definition of terrorism as, “The unlawful and premeditated use of violence intended to
coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population as a means of advancing a
political or ideological cause.” The GTI also rules out any acts by sovereign states as not
constituting terrorism. The GTI rates 186 countries on a possible scale of 1-100; higher
numbers indicate greater risk of terrorism to a country and its assets abroad in the 12
months following the index’s publication. The risk score is composed of five factors
which forecast terrorism, differently weighted depending on significance: motivation
(40%), presence (20%), scale (20%), efficacy (10%), and prevention (10%).
Improving on the sample size in Abadie (2004), I use data from World Bank as
provided to the United Nations (UN) on 2002 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
(PPP) as a measure of poverty. Though this data is from 2002, as opposed to the 2003
data that Abadie uses, I believe it represents an improvement. The greater completeness
of the data allows for observations on over a dozen countries that were dropped in earlier
studies. Furthermore, per capita PPP is a more accurate measure of poverty than just
looking at the raw GDP. The weakness of using slightly older data is that while in most
countries changes were likely very small, some salient examples like Iraq or Afghanistan
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have likely changed more dramatically. However, examples such as those are rife with
endogeneity problems and that makes it hard to say if they would actually be better.
To ensure that the results are robust and maintain ease of comparison to Abadie
(2004) this paper will use the most recent UN Human Development Index (HDI) or the
Gini Index in place of GDP in some regressions. The HDI weighs life expectancy, adult
literacy, combined enrollment ratios for all levels of schooling, and GDP to give each
country a value from 0-1 with higher numbers representing the most development. The
Gini Index is a measure of inequality in a country; it is defined as the area between the
Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage. A
value of 0 represents perfect equality and 100 represents perfect inequality.
To measure the degree of political freedom in each country I use Freedom
House’s Freedom in the World 2004 Political Rights Index. This rates countries from 1-7
with a lower score representing greater freedom. Perhaps because I used 2004 data, as
opposed to 2003, I managed to improve on the sample size over Abadie (2004) with data
on territories and disputed areas in addition to the independent countries that he considers.
As such, this paper is not forced to drop Hong Kong, Macau, Puerto Rico, the Palestinian
Authority, or North Korea. The Freedom House also reports a Civil Liberties Index
which was used by Krueger and Laitin (2003); however this index is highly collinear with
the Political Rights Index used by Abadie (2004) and would provide almost exactly the
same result. Regardless, in order to keep comparability between this paper and Abadie
(2004) at a maximum, I opted to stick with the political rights measure.
Just as Abadie (2004) did, I take linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization
indices from Alesina et al (2002). The indices represent the probability that any two
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individuals chosen at random from a country belong to different linguistic, ethnic, or
religious groups. There are two important things to keep in mind with these data. Firstly,
ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations are significantly correlated. It is not surprising
that individuals of different ethnic groups are more likely to speak different languages
than people of the same ethnic group.

Secondly, when they measure linguistic

fractionalization, which proves to be the most important of the three indices in this
paper’s regressions, Alesina et al (2002) look at data on first languages only. They do not
look at whether individuals are likely to share a common language. Somewhere like
Montreal, where residents move comfortably between French or English, will have a
fairly highly linguistic fractionalization index even if there is no real difficulty in
communication. Thus it may be the case that the linguistic fractionalization variable is
proxying for some combination of linguistic, ethnic, and other cultural factors.
Regardless of its precise makeup, there is little reason to think that it may be correlated
with any of the other variables tested in this paper and it maintains its usefulness as a
measure of social division within a country.
Geographic data come from Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs (2001) and measure
country land area, average elevation, and the fraction of land area in the Köppen-Geiger
tropics.
Finally, I include data from the International Labor Office (ILO) on the total adult
unemployment rate in a country. The data are the annualized values for the most recent
year available, which is 2003 in the vast majority of cases. Unfortunately, data were only
available for 117 of the 186 countries in this study. The countries that are left out are
consistently very poor, have higher linguistic fractionalization, have fewer political rights
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and are often involved in violent conflicts. However, the distribution of terrorist risk in
the group without data is roughly similar to the distribution of risk in the sample with
unemployment data reported. The list of countries without adequate unemployment data
however includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and most of Africa.

Empirics and Results
To begin my empirical work, I use the country-level cross-section data described
above in a series of Ordinary Least Squares regressions.

The general form of the

estimating equations is:
ln(terrorist risk) = β0 + β1 ln(GDP per capita) + β2 X + ε
The vector X includes all of the potential predictors of terrorism previously described:
lack of political rights, unemployment, geographic variables, and linguistic, ethnic, and
religious fractionalization. All regressions also include an exhaustive set of regional
dummy variables based on the groupings used in the WMRC-GTI.
For my initial series of regressions, I considered the maximum number of
observations available as I went along. Thus, as more variables are added in, the number
of observations in the regressions has the unfortunate trend of decreasing. The results of
these regressions are reported in Table II. Columns (1) – (5) mirror estimations in
Abadie (2004), and produce very similar results even with my slightly modified data set.
The coefficient on log GDP in column (1) is significant and shows that a 1% increase in
GDP per capita is associated with a .19% reduction in terrorist risk.
Columns (2) and (3) add in the index for lack of political rights and show the nonmonotonic relationship of political rights and terrorist risk as found in Abadie (2004).
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This relationship shows that countries on both ends of the political rights spectrum are the
least likely to suffer terrorist attacks. Liberal countries with many political freedoms and
authoritarian countries where people are highly regulated have the least risk; but middleranking countries, often in a state of political transition, have the greatest risk.
The three fractionalization indices are added in column (4) and we find that only
linguistic fractionalization bears a significant coefficient.

Also in this column, the

coefficient on GDP remains negative, but becomes statistically insignificant. In column
(5) the ethnic and religious fractionalization indices are removed, causing two major
changes in the estimation. Firstly, the coefficient on linguistic fractionalization becomes
significant at the 1% level, where it had previously only been at the 5% level. This is not
surprising because of the degree of colinearity with ethnic fractionalization may
previously have divided some of the relationship between the two variables. Secondly,
we see that the coefficient on log GDP per capita has returned to significance, marking
the first serious departure from the results in Abadie (2004) yielded by the different data
set in this paper. Regardless, further tests still manage to reduce the coefficient on log
GDP per capita to insignificant levels.
In column (6) I introduce my novel variable of total adult unemployment rate into
the estimation equation. The previously included variables all remain significant to at
least a 10% level and unemployment is found to be highly significant at a 1% level. The
regression estimates that a 1% increase in the adult unemployment rate is associated with
a .02% increase in the risk of terrorism in a country.
Due to concerns about possible endogeneity, because terrorism can certainly
weaken an economy, in columns (7) through (12) this paper tries to go a step beyond the
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level of GDP per capita. In those columns I include geographic variables for country size,
average elevation, and tropical climate with the rationale that studies have related
geography and climate to wealth, and that certain types of geography may lend
themselves more to terrorism than others. For example, the mountains of Afghanistan
have proven notoriously difficult to flush terrorists out of and have definitely contributed
to Afghanistan’s 6th place ranking out of the 186 countries in the GTI.
In column (7), with the unemployment variable left out, the geographic variables
essentially overwhelm the rest of the included factors. The regression coefficients on all
three geographic variables are significant at a 1% level. Linguistic fractionalization
remains significant, but now only at a 10% level and political rights and GDP fall out of
the range where they can be statistically distinguished from zero.
However, when we add back in unemployment as a regressor in column (8), the
degree of political freedom becomes once again significant, but now linguistic
fractionalization is no longer significant. It is difficult to speculate about the reason for
the phasing in and out of significance of political freedom and linguistic fractionalization.
The two variables are not collinear to any mentionable degree with each other or with
unemployment, so why they interact as they do is not obvious.
Instead of GDP per capita, in columns (9) and (10) poverty is measured with the
UN Human Development Index. The HDI is a broader measure and includes health and
education components in addition to GDP. Column (10) yields results very similar to
column (8), with unemployment and geographic variables once again highly significant.
This suggests a degree of robustness to the results obtained with GDP per capita.
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However, in columns (11) and (12) where poverty is now measured with the Gini
Index, the coefficient on the index is significant as are the coefficients on all other
estimation variables. The coefficient on the Gini Index is negative which surprisingly
suggests that wealth inequality may be associated with a reduction in terrorist risk even
though overall average wealth in a country is not. If there were causality here, it would
mean that countries with a high degree of equality are actually more at risk of terror than
very unequal countries. This result is contrary to other evidence which concludes that
characteristics that make people feel marginalized make them more likely to resort to
terrorism. This may just be the result of a small sample size and the skewing effect of a
large number of extremely unequal African countries that do not draw the ire of any
terrorist groups, though the included regional dummies should insolate the results from
such effects. However, there is a chance that there is a genuine relationship between
equality and terrorism, as counterintuitive as it seems.
It is interesting to note that in column (11) the results of this paper differ from
those of Abadie (2004) despite running almost exactly the same regression as he does at
one point. The Abadie (2004) paper does not find Gini coefficients to be significant. To
look deeper at this problem, the only difference between my data and that in Abadie
(2004) is that my data on linguistic fractionalization is 1 year more recent and contains 1
fewer observation. Whichever country was dropped, it may be an outlier in its Gini
coefficient or in some other way. This should give us further caution before drawing any
conclusions about economic inequality and terrorist risk.
Overall, the results on the OLS regressions found in Table II show that when
country characteristics for linguistic fractionalization, political freedom, unemployment,
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and geography are considered, neither GDP per capita or human development have
significant relationships with terrorist risk.

OLS Robustness
Unemployment rate was shown to have a highly statistically significant
association with the risk of terrorism in the above OLS regressions. However, there are
several potential complications to be addressed before any hard conclusions can be drawn.
One immediately apparent problem is the number of observations in regressions
containing an unemployment variable is noticeably lower than the baseline regressions
building up to it. This is because unemployment data is unavailable for a large number of
less developed countries or countries in the midst of domestic strife. Regardless of the
reasons for the reduced number of observations, the problem is that changes in the dataset
may cause significant changes across the board, causing one column not to be
comparable to its neighbor.
In order to address this problem, I created a second, limited dataset containing
only the 105 countries for which I had a complete set of data on all tested variables.
Descriptive statistics for the limited dataset are reported in Table III. If we compare the
statistics from the full data set in Table I with this limited set, we can get a rough idea if
the omitted countries share common characteristics.
A quick comparison shows that the two data sets exhibit very little difference in
mean and standard deviation for dependent variable, terrorist risk, as well as many of the
right-hand side variables.

The two most prominent differences are in GDP per capita
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and in political freedom. The omitted countries tend to be a little poorer and a little less
politically free.
When looking at the regressions on the 105 country sample, we should keep a few
things in mind. First, because GDP per capita ended up not being significant once other
characteristics were accounted for in the earlier regressions, we should be skeptical if that
result changes. Second, the mean of the freedom index has dropped, indicating more
freedom in the 105 country sample, while the terrorist risk statistics have remained
basically constant. If the non-monotonic result for political freedom proves to be robust,
then we should expect to see the positive coefficient on political rights and the negative
coefficient on political rights squared become farther apart, indicating more dramatic
sloping to the non-linear curve as we move along the spectrum from liberal states to
authoritarian states.
Table IV reports the estimation coefficients after running the same series of
regressions as earlier on the limited 105 country sample. When compared to the earlier
results in Table II, the limited sample produces extremely similar estimations. All of the
previous conclusions about the complete dataset hold for the smaller set with the possible
exception that linguistic fractionalization is not as consistently significant in the 105
country set. From this, I conclude that the 105 country set has no glaring irregularities
that distinguish it from the larger set. Overall, this gives strong support for concluding
that the highly significant estimation coefficients on unemployment are robust.
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Cautions
Prior to drawing final conclusions, let me caution the reader with some of the
general weaknesses of this study. First and most important is that terrorism is impossible
to truly predict. Terrorists operate on a global scale and work actively to strike where
they are unexpected. Some like Al-Qaeda have very wide goals and targets around the
world; some act solely in their own countries as rebel groups too small to fully start a
civil war. This paper hopes only to shed light on some of the factors that correlate with
terrorist risk, be it by drawing the attention of international terrorists, as in the case of the
United States, or by producing local terrorism as in Columbia.
Another point of caution is that while I have shown that at least one economic
variable is significant in addition to social and political factors, the predictive power of
unemployment is not as strong as those of the other significant factors. Though highly
statistically significant, even if we granted complete causality to unemployment (which
would be extremely charitable) the magnitude of the coefficient is small relative to the
other significant variables and does not explain the majority of the dependent variable.
That said, when the unemployment variable is added beyond all other considered factors
in Table II, the R2 value goes from 0.35 in column (7) to 0.47 in column (8); this is not a
small jump by any means.
Further, when testing unemployment rates endogeneity problems may exist.
Terrorism has a negative impact on economies and can disturb business, reduce growth,
and very possibly as a consequence raise unemployment. This is an extremely difficult
problem for which to control.

Perhaps a better measure than recent annualized

unemployment rate would have been to look at long-term unemployment or rates over a
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few recent years. Unfortunately, data on unemployment is already scarce for a huge
number of countries and I am unable to find long-term unemployment data for more than
a handful of countries beyond the OECD. While questions of endogeneity are difficult to
resolve empirically, the significant correlation is nonetheless present and there are many
good reasons to think that unemployment may indeed have a causal relationship to
terrorism.

Conclusions
Using a more complete dataset than previous studies and testing new variables, I
find that the economic variable of unemployment has a significant association with
terrorist risk. My results also confirm previous work suggesting that political freedom,
population fractionalization and geography are also powerful predictors of terrorism.
Like other studies, I find that GDP per capita does not have a statistically significant
relationship with terrorism once these other variables are taken into account.
My results also suggest that as a country’s Gini coefficient increases, meaning the
gap between rich and poor grows, terrorist risk may be reduced. However, these results
are counter-intuitive and never significant beyond the 10% level. Therefore, I hope to do
more testing in the future with inequality and Gini coefficients before drawing any hard
conclusions about inequality and terrorism.
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Description

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Terrorist Risk

WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/04

186

40.05

19.87

10

94

GDP per capita
Human Development
Gini Index

GDP per capita in PPP for 2002 in US dollars
UN Human Development Index 2002
Index of income or consumption inequality, various years

169
171
122

9312
0.70
40.6

10122
0.18
10.17

520
0.27
24.4

61190
0.96
70.7

Lack of Political Rights

Freedom House Political Rights Index, 2004

182

3.52

2.16

1

7

Linguistic Fractionalization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization

Probability two random individuals have different native language
Probability two random individuals have different ethnicity
Probability two random individuals have different religion

173
174
181

0.39
0.45
0.43

0.28
0.25
0.23

0.002
0
0.002

0.92
0.93
0.86

Unemployment

ILO annualized adult unemployment rate of both genders, 2003

117

9.60

6.53

1.1

36.7

Country Area
Elevation
Tropical Weather

Area in million square kilometers
Average elevation above sea level in hundred meters
Fraction of country in Köppen-Geiger tropics

161
161
161

0.81
6.17
0.31

2.03
5.57
0.41

0.0026
0.092
0

16.6
31.86
1
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Table II – Terrorism and Country Characteristics
OLS with Robust Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Natural logarithim of WMRC Global Terrorism Index
(1)
Log GDP per
capita (PPP)

(2)

(3)

-0.1990*** -0.1618*** -0.1286**
(0.0452)
(0.0467)
(0.0495)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.0909
(0.0550)

-0.1058**
(0.0518)

-0.1276*
(0.0762)

-0.0775
(0.0532)

-0.0403
(0.0770)

Human
Development Index

(9)

(10)

-0.2134
(0.4160)

-0.0473
(0.6175)

Gini index
0.0508**
(0.0252)

(11)

(12)

-0.0087*
(0.0049)

-0.0112*
(0.0058)

0.2507**
(0.1028)

0.2226**
(0.1082)

0.2225**
(0.1054)

0.3419**
(0.1303)

0.1840
(0.1121)

0.2828**
(0.1193)

0.2271**
(0.1106)

0.3075***
(0.1166)

0.2104*
(0.1065)

0.2708**
(0.1222)

-0.0249**
(0.0119)

-0.0218*
(0.0124)

-0.0220*
(0.0122)

-0.0389**
(0.0168)

-0.0197
(0.0129)

-0.0354**
(0.0151)

-0.0243*
(0.0126)

-0.0379**
(0.0148)

-0.0237*
(0.0130)

-0.0339**
(0.0168)

Linguistic
Fractionalization

0.5397**
(0.2271)

0.4962***
(0.1634)

0.4315**
(0.1887)

0.3533*
(0.1793)

0.2387
(0.1885)

0.3655**
(0.1797)

0.2292
(0.1884)

0.4811**
(0.1861)

0.3603*
(0.1937)

Ethnic
Fractionalization

-0.0045
(0.2477)

Religious
Fractionalization

-0.0711
(0.1692)

Lack of Political
Rights
Lack of Political
Rights Squared

0.0212***
(0.0072)

Unemployment
Rate

0.0221***
(0.0069)

0.0220***
(0.0070)

0.0213***
(0.0070)

Country Area

0.0516*** 0.0506*** 0.0492*** 0.0490*** 0.0458*** 0.0503***
(0.0124)
(0.0137)
(0.0122)
(0.0133)
(0.0145)
(0.0169)

Average Elevation

0.0182*** 0.0270*** 0.0201*** 0.0287*** 0.0204*** 0.0283***
(0.0061)
(0.0075)
(0.0060)
(0.0072)
(0.0061)
(0.0072)

Tropical Weather
Percentage

0.3699***
(0.1228)

0.4858**
(0.1863)

0.35
147

0.47
105

R-squared
Observations

0.17
169

0.19
169

0.21
169

0.26
158

0.27
160

0.35
110

0.3759*** 0.5077*** 0.4306*** 0.5439***
(0.1238)
(0.1844)
(0.1302)
(0.1776)
0.35
147

0.47
105

0.44
117

0.53
92

Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regression included a comprehensive set of regional dummy variables based on the country groupings used in
the WMRC-GTI.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table III
Descriptive Statistics – Limited Dataset

Variable

Description

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Terrorist Risk

WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/04

105

43.47

20.66

12.5

94

GDP per capita
Human Development
Gini Index

GDP per capita in PPP for 2002 in US dollars
UN Human Development Index 2002
Index of income or consumption inequality, various years

105
105
92

11717
0.77
39.0

10992
0.1345
10.16

580
0.34
24.4

61190
0.96
70.7

Lack of Political Rights

Freedom House Political Rights Index, 2004

105

2.83

1.97

1

7

Linguistic Fractionalization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization

Probability two random individuals have different native language
Probability two random individuals have different ethnicity
Probability two random individuals have different religion

105
104
105

0.31
0.38
0.40

0.25
0.23
0.23

0.002
0.002
0.002

0.92
0.93
0.86

Unemployment

ILO annualized adult unemployment rate of both genders, 2003

105

9.22

6.36

1.1

36.7

Country Area
Elevation
Tropical Weather

Area in million square kilometers
Average elevation above sea level in hundred meters
Fraction of country in Köppen-Geiger tropics

105
105
105

1.01
6.12
0.24

2.46
5.61
0.38

0.0027
0.092
0

16.6
31.86
1
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Table IV – Terrorism and Country Characteristics with Limited Sample
OLS with Robust Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Natural logarithim of WMRC Global Terrorism Index
(1)
Log GDP per
capita (PPP)

(2)

-0.2053*** -0.1730**
(0.0660)
(0.0831)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)†

-0.0994
(0.0919)

-0.1095
(0.1023)

-0.1029
(0.0901)

-0.1122
(0.0861)

-0.0343
(0.0834)

-0.0403
(0.0770)

Human
Development Index

(9)

(10)†

-0.0792
(0.6665)

-0.0473
(0.6175)

Gini index
0.0295
(0.0477)

Lack of Political
Rights

0.3377**
(0.1392)

0.3674**
(0.1470)

0.3315**
(0.1409)

0.3284**
(0.1379)

0.2931**
(0.1227)

0.2828**
(0.1193)

0.3107**
(0.1235)

0.3075***
(0.1166)

(11)

(12)†

-0.0099*
(0.0059)

-0.0112*
(0.0058)

0.2786**
(0.1310)

0.2708**
(0.1222)

-0.0407** -0.0443** -0.0398** -0.0368** -0.0396** -0.0354** -0.0414*** -0.0379** -0.0376** -0.0339**
(0.0176)
(0.0183)
(0.0175)
(0.0174)
(0.0151)
(0.0151)
(0.0153)
(0.0148)
(0.0177)
(0.0168)

Lack of Political
Rights Squared
Linguistic
Fractionalization

0.5351**
(0.2601)

Ethnic
Fractionalization

-0.2680
(0.2941)

Religious
Fractionalization

0.1726
(0.2621)

0.3964*
(0.2025)

0.3716*
(0.1909)

0.2686
(0.2014)

0.0220***
(0.0073)

Unemployment
Rate

0.2387
(0.1885)

0.2609
(0.2023)

0.0221***
(0.0069)

0.2292
(0.1884)

0.4152*
(0.2091)

0.0220***
(0.0070)

0.3603*
(0.1937)

0.0213***
(0.0070)

Country Area

0.0516*** 0.0506*** 0.0504*** 0.0490*** 0.0500*** 0.0503***
(0.0135)
(0.0137)
(0.0131)
(0.0133)
(0.0163)
(0.0169)

Average Elevation

0.0279*** 0.0270*** 0.0292*** 0.0287*** 0.0269*** 0.0283***
(0.0078)
(0.0075)
(0.0075)
(0.0072)
(0.0076)
(0.0072)

Tropical Weather
Percentage

0.4229**
(0.1991)

0.4858**
(0.1863)

0.4393**
(0.1957)

0.5077***
(0.1844)

0.4671**
(0.1942)

0.5439***
(0.1776)

0.42
105

0.47
105

0.42
105

0.47
105

0.48
92

0.53
92

R-squared
Observations

0.23
105

0.24
105

0.28
105

0.30
104

0.30
105

0.36
105

Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regression included a comprehensive set of regional dummy variables based on the country groupings used in
the WMRC-GTI.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† Identical to regressions in Table II
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